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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked 
pursuant to Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure• 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues to be determined by this Court are 
set forth in the Certification Order submitted by the 
Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins, United States Federal 
District Court. The questions of law at issue before 
this Court, pursuant to the Certification Order, are as 
follows: 
1. What is the burden of proof necessary to 
establish waiver under Utah law? 
a. Is there one standard generally 
applicable to all situations involving waiver? 
b. Are there two (2) different applicable 
standards depending on whether waiver is 
alleged from a party's actions or conduct, or 
a party's possessive inaction or silence? 
1. Where waiver is alleged from a 
party's action or conduct. must the 
action or conduct of that party 
unequivocally show an intent to waive 
or at least be inconsistent with any 
other intent? 
2. Where waiver is alleged from a 
2 
party's silence or failure to act, must 
the silence or failure to act on the 
part of the party be unequivocal and 
inconsistent with any other intent? 
2. Were the jury instruction given in the 
instant case consistent with Utah law on the law of 
waiver? 
3. Were the special interrogatories asked in 
the instant case consistent with the law of waiver? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Federal District Court case, from which the 
issues have been certified for determination by this 
Court, originated in the Third District Court, Summit 
County, State of Utah. The trial of the matter was heard 
between May 11 and May 26, 1988 and was presided over by 
the Honorable Ernest Baldwin, a Senior District Court 
Judge. At the close of the evidence, the jury was 
charged as to the applicable law and instructed to 
respond to 52 Special Jury Interrogatories. 
The jury returned their responses to the 
Special Jury Interrogatories, a copy of which is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A". Over the next succeeding month, 
the parties filed numerous motions and the Court held 
several hearings concerning the effect to be given to the 
jury's responses to the Special Interrogatories. (See 
Findings of Facts pp. 2-3). Almost one year after the 
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jury rendered its responses, on April 18, 1989, the trial 
court executed a set of Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and an Order, Judgment, and Decree of Foreclosure. 
The parties were requested by Judge Baldwin to prepare 
and submit to the Court their post-trial motions and the 
Court would decide the remaining issues when it ruled on 
the parties' post-trial motions. The Court stayed 
execution on the judgment until the post-trial motions 
were heard. 
After the Findings and Judgment were entered, 
but prior to the Court's ruling on the parties' various 
post-trial motions, Deseret Federal was placed into 
receivership under the direction of the Resolution Trust 
Corporation, which removed State Court case to the United 
States District Court, District of Utah. As a result, 
the post-trial motions filed in the State Court action 
have never been heard or decided. 
The Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins, United States 
District Court Judge, determined that the Utah law of 
waiver is controlling in resolving this matter. After 
reviewing the cases in which the issue of waiver was 
determined in the Utah Courts of Appeal, the Federal 
District Court determined that the resulting body of Utah 
law concerning the definition and elements of waiver was 
ambiguous and that there appeared to be no clear 
controlling Utah law on the law of waiver. Accordingly, 
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the Federal District Court certified the issue for a 
decision by this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Soter's Inc., ("Soter") was the owner and 
developer on a construction project known as "the Camelot 
Condominium project", (the "Project"). (See Findings of 
Fact, 1). 
2. Zions First National Bank provided Soter 
the original construction financing for the Project. 
(See Trial Exhibit 2; Pretrial Order, paragraph 14). 
3. Soter hired Tri-K and Tri-K agreed to act 
as the general contractor for the Project. (See Findings 
of Fact, 6). 
4. Tri-K provided labor and materials to the 
Project from August, 1983 through April 19, 1985. 
5. Soter and Tri-K executed several different 
AIA Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contract 
(the "Construction Contract") for the Project. The 
various construction contracts reflected the changes in 
the scope of construction and the resulting increases in 
the cost to construct the Project. (See the Construction 
Contract between Soter and Tri-K, Trial Exhibits 3, 4002, 
4003, and 4004). 
6. All of the construction agreements between 
Tri-K and Soter, except one, provided that Project was to 
be completed "in a timely manner". (See Trial Exhibits 
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4001, 4002, and 4003). 
7. The jury determined that the operable 
construction contract between Soter and Tri-K provided 
that Tri-K was to receive the amount of $2,801,850.00 for 
labor and materials to complete the Project and also 
provided for a completion date for the Project of 
December 31, 1984. (See Jury Response No. 18). 
8. Prior to the completion of the Project, 
Soter entered into an arrangement with Deseret Federal to 
replace Zions as the construction lender for the Project. 
(See Trial Exhibit 115). 
9. While Zions was the Project lender for 
Soter, Zions made disbursements for numerous "soft" costs 
(non-construction related costs). These soft costs 
included payments out of the loan for legal fees, loan 
commitment fees, permits, licenses, land purchases, etc. 
The soft costs paid out of the Zions loan totaled 
$917,988.00. (See Trial Exhibits Nos. 2 (Zions Loan 
Payoff) and 2013 (Summary of Soft Cost Disbursements), 
copies of which are attached hereto as Exhibits MB,f and 
"C", respectively.) 
10. The construction loan made by Deseret 
Federal for the Project was for the total amount of 
$3,000,000.00 and was secured by a Trust Deed on the 
Project. The Project was appraised at $3,700,000.00. 
(Trial Exhibit No. 8, Findings of Fact, 9 and 10). 
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11. Deseret Federal also granted Soter a line 
of credit for the Project in the amount of $350#000.00 
which was secured by a Trust Deed on 350 acres of land in 
Summit County owned by Summit Park Company, a company 
also controlled by members of the Soter family. (See 
Trial Exhibit No. 9, Findings of Fact, 16 and 17). 
12. Deseret Federal paid off Soter's 
construction loan with Zions, the balance of which was 
$1,260,621.19, out of the $5,000,000.00 construction loan 
made by Deseret Federal to Soter. (See Trial Exhibit No. 
2). 
13. Included in the $1,260,621.19 paid by 
Deseret Federal to Zions, were the soft costs of 
$917,988.00, referenced above. 
14. Payment of soft costs by Deseret Federal 
out of the construction loan made it mathematically 
impossible for Deseret Federal to fund Tri-K's fixed 
price construction contract, which was the amount of 
$2,801,850.00, the $3,000,000.00 loan, less $2,801,850.00 
construction contract, less $917,988.00 of soft non-
construction costs. (See Trial Exhibit No. 2013, a copy 
of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "C"). 
15. Deseret Federal required the participation 
of another lender to underwrite the construction loan for 
the Project. (See Trial Exhibit No. 115). 
16. Continental Federal Savings and Loan 
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("Continental") verbally agreed to participate with 
Deseret Federal in the construction loan for the Project. 
Deseret Federal and Continental, however, did not at any 
time enter into a written participation agreement for the 
construction loan. (Trial Exhibit No. 8, Findings of 
Fact, 24). 
17. Continental required Deseret Federal to 
deliver to it physical possession of promissory notes and 
the Trust Deeds, referenced above, held by Deseret 
Federal for the construction loan and the line of credit 
before Continental would repay Deseret Federal for 
disbursements made by Deseret Federal on the loan. (See 
Trial Exhibit No. 143, Findings of Fact, 24). 
18. Only after Deseret Federal delivered the 
notes and Trust Deeds to Continental, did Continental 
make its first and only disbursement to Deseret Federal 
for the Soter loan. (See Trial Exhibit No. 145, Finding 
of Fact, 24). 
19. Continental refused to provide further 
disbursements, even though Deseret Federal repeatedly 
requested Continental to provide funding for the 
Project's construction. (See Trial Exhibits Nos. 142, 
145, 2017, and 2020). 
20. Continental refused to disburse additional 
money to Deseret Federal, not because Tri-K was not 
progressing satisfactorily with the work at the Project, 
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but based upon Continental's claim that the construction 
loan was "out of balance". (Continental claimed the loan 
was out of balance because the amount remaining in the 
construction loan, after the payment of soft costs, was 
insufficient to cover the remaining construction costs 
for the Project). (See Trial Exhibit No. 2020, a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "D"). 
21. The winters of 1983 and 1984 were two of 
the harshest on record for northern Utah. (Trial 
Transcript, Sherwin Knudsen, May 13, 1988, at pp. 62-64.) 
22. By October, 1984, all parties knew that 
the Project could not be completed until at least mid-
year 1985. (Trial Transcript, Mr. Anderson, 
[Construction loan manager for Deseret Federal], May 19, 
1988). 
23. At no time before or after December 31, 
1984, did any party allege or give notice to Tri-K that 
it was in breach in any way of its Construction Contract 
until the filing of the lawsuit in the Utah State Court. 
[Trial Transcript, May 19, 1988, p, 65 (Anderson), a copy 
of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "E"; Trial 
Transcript, May 13, 1988, pp. 12-13 (Stoll)]. 
24. Tri-K continued to provide labor and 
materials to the Project pursuant to the terms of the 
Construction Contract and continued to submit draw 
requests to Deseret Federal for work and materials 
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provided to the Project after December 31, 1984. (Trial 
Transcript, May 12, 1988, pp. 24-25, 32, 34, 50, 51-52, 
58 (Stoll); Trial Transcript, May 13, 1988, pp. 129-130 
(Knudsen); Findings of Fact, 28). 
25. In February, 1985, Deseret Federal paid 
Tri-K the draw request submitted for labor and materials 
provided to the Project in December, 1984 which was for 
the amount of $72,256.00. (See Findings of Fact no. 41). 
26. Deseret Federal failed to pay Tri-K the 
amounts requested in draw requests numbers 9, 10, and 11 
(Trial Exhibits 41, 42, and 43) submitted by Tri-K to 
Deseret Federal, which draw requests were submitted in 
the first months of 1985 and totaled $166,664,90. (See 
Findings of Fact, 28). 
27. Soter and Deseret Federal requested Tri-K 
to continue work at the Project. [Trial Transcript, May 
12, 1988, pp. 32-34, 51-58, (Stoll) May 13, 1988, pp. 
129-30 (Knudsen)]. 
28. On April 16, 1985, Tri-K delivered a 
letter to Soter and Deseret Federal stating it would 
leave the Project on April 19, 1985, unless the 
outstanding draw requests were paid. (See Trial Exhibit 
169, a copy is attached as Exhibit "F"). 
29. When Tri-K was not paid, it abandoned the 
Project and filed a lawsuit, designated as Case No. 8561 
in the Third Judicial District Court, Summit County, 
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State of Utah. 
30. Tri-K filed a Notice of Lien for the 
amounts due for the unpaid draw requests. (See Trial 
Exhibit No. 2014). 
31. Judge Baldwin ruled, in a post-trial 
hearing held on July 5, 1988, that Tri-K was justified in 
leaving the Project when it was not paid its draw 
requests and that Deseret Federal waived its right to 
have the Project completed. (See a copy of the hearing 
transcript of July 5, 1988 attached hereto as Exhibit 
MG"). 
32. The Construction Loan Agreement (Trial 
Exhibit No. 1) between Soter and Deseret Federal provided 
that the construction loan could not be extended if the 
Project was in breach. Section 4.3. of the Construction 
Loan Agreement provided: 
Lender [Deseret Federal] may, in its 
sole discretion, extend said date to 
October 4, 1985, upon the following 
constitutions: . . b. no event of 
default or event which with the 
lapse of time, the giving of notice, 
or both would constitute an event of 
default shall have occurred or be 
continuing under this Agreement. . . 
33. On April 2, 1985, Deseret Federal approved 
an extension of Soter's construction Loan. (The 
Extension of Deseret Federal, Trial Exhibit 25, attached 
hereto as Exhibit "H"). 
34. The first and only notice from Deseret 
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Federal alleging breach by Tri-K was delivered to United 
Pacific Insurance Company ("UPIC"), not Tri-K, and it was 
not delivered until June 12, 1985, some two months after 
Tri-K had left the job. (See Trial Exhibit No. 91). 
35. The Trial Court instructed the jury in the 
following manner on the law of waiver. (See Jury 
Instrument No. 18): 
A waiver is the intentional 
relinquishment of a known right. To 
constitute a waiver, there must be 
an existing right, benefit or 
advantage, a knowledge of its 
existence and an intention to 
relinquish it. To constitute 
waiver, one's actions or conduct 
must be distinctly made, must 
clearly display in some unequivocal 
manner and intent to waive, and must 
be inconsistent with any other 
intent. 
36. The jury found, with respect to Soter, 
that Deseret Federal distinctly relinquished its right 
under the Construction Loan Agreement to require that the 
Project be completed on or before April 4, 1985, (see 
Jury Responses to Jury Interrogatory 6, Exhibit "A" 
attached hereto); that its relinquishment was clearly 
displciyed in an unequivocal manner (see Jury Responses to 
Jury Interrogatory 7, Exhibit "A" hereto); and the jury 
held that Deseret Federal's intent to waive was 
inconsistent with any other intent. (See Jury Responses 
to Jury Interrogatory 8, Exhibit "A" hereto). 
37. The jury further found, with respect to 
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Tri-K, that Deseret Federal distinctly relinquished its 
right under the Construction Contract to require that the 
Project be completed on or before December 31, 1984 (see 
Jury Responses to Jury Interrogatory 22, Exhibit "A" 
hereto); and that such relinquishment was clearly 
displayed in an unequivocal manner. (See Jury Responses 
to Jury Interrogatory 23, Exhibit "A" hereto). 
38. The jury also found, with respect to UPIC, 
that Deseret Federal distinctly relinquished its right 
under the Construction Contract to require that the 
Project be completed on or before December 31, 1984 (see 
Jury Responses to Jury Interrogatories 48 and 50
 f Exhibit 
"A" hereto); and that such relinquishment was clearly 
displayed in an unequivocal manner. (See Jury Responses 
to Jury Interrogatory No. 9, Exhibit "A" hereto). 
39. The only finding by the jury in their 
Responses to the Jury Interrogatories concerning waiver 
which was not answered in the affirmative, was Jury 
Response No. 24, which provided: 
Has Tri-K established by a 
preponderance of the evidence that 
any evidence of an intent by Deseret 
Federal to relinquish the right 
under the Construction Contract to 
have the Camelot Condominium Project 
completed on or before December 31, 
1984 was inconsistent with any other 
intent? 
40. The jury was, however, specifically asked 
if Deseret Federal had demonstrated another "intent" with 
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regard to Tri-K. (See Jury Interrogatories 31 through 
39, Exhibit "A" hereto). 
41. The jury found, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that Deseret Federal intended and did defraud 
Tri-K. (See Jury Responses to Jury Interrogatories 31 
through 39, Exhibit "A" hereto). 
SUMMARY OR ARGUMENT 
Under Utah law, at the time of the trial of the 
subject case, the party claiming the benefit of waiver 
had the burden of showing that there was an existing 
right, benefit, or advantage, a knowledge of its 
existence and an intention to relinquish it. This Court 
has held that the relinquishment of the right must have 
been distinctly made, although the intent to waive could 
be shown either expressly or impliedly. The trial court 
erred in its definition of waiver as given to the jury. 
The trial court erred in presenting Special 
Jury Interrogatory 24 regarding Deseret Federal's waiver 
of the December 31, 1984 completion date to the jury. 
The elements contained in Jury Interrogatory 24 were not 
consistent with Utah law and, as such, the trial court 
was not justified in giving said Interrogatory to the 
jury. 
Deseret Federal's waiver of the December 31, 
1984 completion date was clear, distinct, and unequivocal 
when viewed with the undisputed facts of this case. 
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The additional element of waiver, as stated in 
Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P. 2d 420, 432, (Utah 1983), that 
the intent to waive a right be inconsistent with any 
other intent, becomes impossible in commercial cases 
where, as here, the jury is required to consider several 
different and conflicting intents. 
PREFACE 
United Pacific Insurance Company, in its brief 
filed in this matter, exhaustively reviewed the law of 
waiver and the standards applicable to determine waiver. 
Tri-K joins and supports the argument contained in the 
brief filed by United Pacific Insurance Company. 
Accordingly, Tri-K will not repeat the issues, arguments, 
or citations contained in United Pacific Insurance 
Company's brief. 
Tri-K will focus on questions 2 and 3 presented 
in the Federal District Court's Statement of Issues and 
submits the following argument as additional support for 
Tri-K's position. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN THE 
JURY THE TRIAL COURT WERE NOT 
CONSISTENT WITH THE LAW OF WAIVER 
WHICH EXISTED AT THE TIME OF 
TRIAL. 
Prior to 1983, the law of waiver was clear and 
unambiguous. Waiver was defined as the intentional 
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relinquishment of a known right. To constitute waiver, 
there must have been an existing right, benefit, 
advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention 
to relinquish it. A waiver must have been distinctly 
made, although it could be expressed or implied. Phoenix 
Insurance Co. v. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 61 P.2d 308, 310 
(Utah 1936); American Savings & Loan Assoc, v. Blomquist, 
21 Utah.2d 289, 486 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1986). 
In 1983# this Court decided the domestic 
relations case of Hunter and included in the law of 
waiver the following additional phrase: 
To constitute waiver, one's actions 
or conduct must be distinctly made, 
must evince in some unequivocal 
manner an intent to waiver and must 
be inconsistent with any other 
intent. (Emphasis added). Hunter 
at 432. 
The trial court incorporated the Hunter test in 
its Jury Instructions though Hunter had been overruled at 
the time the subject case came to trial, as shown above. 
In the same year, this Court rendered its 
decision in Hunter, it also issued its ruling in the case 
of Parks v. Zions First National Bank, 763 P.2d 590 (Utah 
1983). This Court in Parks held: 
Waiver is the intentional 
relinquishment of a known right and 
there must be an existing right, 
benefit, or advantage, knowledge of 
its existence, and an intention to 
relinquish it, and it must be 
distinctly made, although it may be 
express or implied. Parks at 604-
16 
605, citing Blomquist. 
There is no mention of the Hunter test of waiver by this 
Court in Parks. 
The next case in which this Court ruled on the 
issue of waiver was the case of Morgan v. Quailbrook 
Condominium Co., 704 P.2d 573 (Utah 1985). In Morgan, 
this Court set forth the elements and definition of 
waiver in the classic three part form, stating: 
A finding of waiver requires that 
the conduct of the actor demonstrate 
an intentional relinquishment of a 
known right. Morgan at 578. 
The Morgan test was the applicable test to be 
applied by the trial court in this case. The Jury 
Instruction given to the jury on waiver was not 
consistent with Utah law on the law of waiver. The 
Hunter waiver test had been overruled by Parks and Morgan 
at the time the subject case was tried. Accordingly, 
the Jury Instruction on waiver in the instant case was 
not consistent with the Utah law of waiver. As such, it 
was an error by the trial court to have defined waiver 
for the jury using the test set forth in Hunter. 
II. 
THE JURY INTERROGATORIES ASKED 
IN THE INSTANT CASE WERE NOT 
CONSISTENT WITH UTAH LAW. 
The next question certified for a determination 
by this Court was: 
3. Were the Special Interrogatories 
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asked in the instant case consistent 
with Utah law on the law of waiver? 
The trial court requested the jury to determine 
whether Deseret Federal had waived the December 31, 1984 
completion date. The jury was requested in Jury 
Interrogatory 22 to answer the following: 
Has Tri-K established by a 
preponderance of the evidence that 
Deseret Federal acted in such a 
manner as to distinctly relinquish 
the right under the construction 
contract to have the Camelot 
Condominium Project completed on or 
before December 31, 1984? 
The jury responded to this Interrogatory in the 
affirmative. 
The jury was then asked, in Jury Interrogatory 
23: 
Has Tri-K established by a 
preponderance of the evidence that 
Deseret Federal clearly displayed in 
some unequivocal manner an intention 
to relinquish the right under the 
construction contract to have the 
Camelot Condominium Project 
completed on or before December 31, 
1984? 
Again, the jury responded to this Jury Interrogatory in 
the affirmative. 
The jury's responses to Jury Interrogatories 22 
and 23 establish beyond doubt that Deseret Federal 
clearly, distinctly, and unequivocally waived the 
December 31, 1984 completion date. As such, the waiver 
of the December 31, 1984 completion date was established 
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using the standard set forth in Morgan. 
Despite the fact that Morgan was the most 
recent pronouncement of the definition and elements of 
waiver at the time of the trial of the subject case, the 
trial court proposed Jury Interrogatory 24, purportedly 
based upon Hunter. Jury Interrogatory 24 was 
unnecessary, superfluous, unworkable, and prejudicial. 
Jury Interrogatory 24 provided: 
Has Tri-K established by a 
preponderance of the evidence that 
any evidence of an intent by Deseret 
Federal to relinquish the right 
under the construction contract to 
have the Camelot Condominium Project 
completed on or before December 31, 
1984 was inconsistent with any 
intent? (Emphasis added). 
The jury in response to Jury Interrogatory 24 answered in 
the negative. 
After the jury had found that Deseret Federal 
had distinctly, clearly, and unequivocally waived its 
right to the Project completed by December 31, 1984, it 
was unnecessary, pursuant to Morgan, to ask the jury to 
determine whether Deseret Federal's motive to waive was 
inconsistent with another intent. Clearly, Jury 
Interrogatory 24 was not justified under Utah's law of 
waiver. 
Even if Hunter were the standard at the time 
the case was heard, the facts of Hunter and its language 
demonstrate the inapplicability of the requirements set 
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forth in Hunter beyond the facts addressed in Hunter. 
Hunter involved a divorced woman who had waited nine 
years to petition the court for an order requiring her 
ex-husband to pay delinquent child support. At the 
hearing, the woman testified that she did not seek 
enforcement of the child support order sooner because she 
was in hiding, fearing violence by her ex-husband. The 
ex-husband claimed that the woman waived her right to 
enforce the order. This Court held that the woman did 
not waive her right to enforce the child support order, 
citing both Phoenix Insurance and American Savings, then 
stating the requirement that the "intent to waive" must 
be inconsistent with any other intent. The additional 
langucige contained in Hunter, seeking action 
"inconsistent with any other intent", was an anomalous 
departure from the standards set forth in the earlier 
decisions rendered by this Court. 
Clearly, under the law and facts of this case, 
it was an error for the trial court to have included the 
Hunter standard in Jury Instruction 24. 
III. 
A. THE FACTS OF THE CASE CLEARLY DEMONSTRATE 
THAT DESERET FEDERAL WAIVED THE DECEMBER 
31, 1984 COMPLETION DATE. 
The facts demonstrated that Deseret Federal 
waived the December 31, 1984 completion date. Deseret 
Federal's express intent to waive the December 31, 1984 
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completion date was distinctly and unequivocally 
demonstrated by its actions and conduct, as shown below. 
On April 2, 1985, Deseret Federal executed a 
written extension allowing Soter to make its first 
payment due on October 5, 1985, not April 5, 1985. The 
Construction Loan Agreement (Trial Exhibit 1) provided at 
section 4.3, page 11: 
The principal amount of the loan, 
together with all accrued and unpaid 
interest shall be due and payable on 
April 4, 1985; provided, however, 
that Lender may, in its sole 
discretion, extend said date to 
October 4, 1985 upon the following 
conditions: (a) Lender shall have 
received from Borrower, prior to 
March 4, 1985, a written request for 
such extension; 
(b) No event of default or event 
which with the lapse of time, the 
giving of notice, or both would 
constitute an event of default shall 
have occurred or be continuing under 
this Agreement; and (c) Borrower 
shall have paid to the Lender on or 
before April 4, 1985 an extension 
fee equal to one percent of the 
outstanding principal balance of the 
loan of April 4, 1985. (Emphasis 
added). 
If Deseret Federal had considered Tri-K's 
failure to complete the Project by December 31, 1984 a 
breach of the Construction Loan Agreement, then it could 
not have granted an extension of the term of the note. 
(See also Findings of Fact No. 29). 
Representatives of Deseret Federal undisputedly 
told Tri-K that the Project should be finished and that 
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Tri-K should remain at the Project. (See Trial 
Transcript, May 12, 1988, pp. 32-34, 51, 58 (Knudsen); 
Trial Transcript, May 13, 1988, pp. 129-130 (Stoll); 
Trial Transcript, May 19, 1988, pp. 65 (Anderson), 
Exhibit "E" hereto). 
Deseret Federal continued to accept draw 
requests for work and labor provided at the Project in 
1985. At no point did Deseret Federal indicate to Tri-K 
that it would not pay any draw request submitted by Tri-K 
for work and labor provided to the Project. In fact, 
Tri-K received payment of its December, 1984 draw request 
on February 7, 1985, which was after the completion date. 
[Findings of Fact No. 41; Trial Transcript, May 13, 1988, 
pp. 12, 13 (Stoll); Trial Transcript, May 18, 1988, pp. 
23 (Redd)]. 
Deseret Federal undisputedly took no steps to 
enforce the completion date or to preserve its rights 
concerning the December 31, 1984 completion date. 
Deseret Federal's representative at the 
Project, Mr. Steve Anderson, testified that he and 
Deseret Federal knew by September or October, 1984 that 
the Project could not be completed "until somewhere 
around year-end of 1985 or before". Mr. Anderson further 
testified that he had discussions on the subject with Ron 
Frandsen, who was the major loan department manager for 
Deseret Federal. [See Trial Transcript, May 19, 1988, 
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pp. 112 (Anderson)]. 
Deseret Federal by extending the term of the 
construction not, by failing to indicate to Tri-K in any 
way that it was in breach of the Construction Contract, 
by asking Tri-K to remain at the Project, by paying Tri-K 
its December, 1984 draw request in February, 1985, by 
Deseret Federal's continuing to accept draw requests for 
work performed after the completion date, and by taking 
no affirmative steps to protect its right under the 
Construction Contract, demonstrated its intent to waive 
the December 31, 1984 completion date. 
At the time of trial of the subject case, a 
waiver could be implied by the conduct or inaction of a 
party. (See Phoenix, American Savings. and Morgan). 
Deseret Federal's actions, both prior to and after 
December 31, 1984, demonstrated its distinct and 
unequivocal intent to waive the completion date. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT DESERET FEDERAL 
WAIVED THE DECEMBER 31, 1984 COMPLETION 
DATE. 
Judge Baldwin, after hearing the testimony and 
reviewing the evidence determined that Deseret Federal 
had waived its right to have the job completed on 
December 31, 1984, notwithstanding the jury's response to 
Jury Interrogatory 24. Judge Baldwin ruled on July 5, 
1988, at a post-trial motion hearing, that: 
. . . that's right, but Soter's — 
and I also feel under these facts 
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and circumstances and all the law 
that I have read, that Deseret 
Federal (is) either (es)stopped or 
waived its right to have the job 
completed, and that they induced and 
led (Tri-K) on to keep on going on 
with the job. And what Mr. What's 
His Name, Knudsen, [principal of 
Tri-K], was entitled when he wasn't 
paid according to the law to walk 
off the job and quit coming, when he 
wasn't paid to get his draw and his 
retention. And I think his leaving 
was, (under) the facts in evidence, 
and the jury's verdict (was) 
justified at the time. (See a copy 
of the transcript attached hereto as 
Exhibit "G"). 
The confusion in this case was created when 
Judge Baldwin ruled that he would enter a set of Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment and that the 
disputes between the parties concerning the meaning and 
effect of the jury's responses to the Jury 
Interrogatories would be resolved by the Court when it 
ruled on the parties' various post-trial motions. The 
Court then signed and had entered the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Decree, but stayed their 
implementation until after the parties' post-trial 
motions were heard. 
Before Judge Baldwin was able to rule on the 
post-trial motions, Deseret Federal was declared 
insolvent and taken over by the Resolution Trust 
Corporation ("RTC") and the case was removed from the 
State Court to the Federal District Court pursuant to 
federal statute. 
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Judge Baldwin had made his ruling concerning 
the issue of the waiver of the completion date. The only 
reason that the issue of waiver has continued to this 
point is RTC's tortured application of the facts and its 
misapplication of the law. 
C. THE JURY RECOGNIZED THAT DESERET FEDERAL 
WAIVED THE DECEMBER 31, 1984 COMPLETION 
DATE. 
The jury, in Jury Interrogatories 48 through 50 
(Exhibit "A" hereto), addressed the issue whether United 
Pacific had established Deseret Federal's waiver of the 
December 31, 1984 completion date. Jury Interrogatories 
48 through 50 followed the Morgan standard. 
Jury Interrogatory 48 provided; 
Has United Pacific Insurance Company 
established by a preponderance of 
the evidence that Deseret Federal 
acted in such a manner as to 
distinctly relinquish its right to 
claim that Tri-K was to have 
completed the Project by December 
31, 1984? (Emphasis added). 
The jury answered in the affirmative. 
Jury Interrogatory 49 provided: 
Has United Pacific Insurance Company 
established by a preponderance of 
the evidence that Deseret Federal 
clearly displayed in some 
unequivocal manner an intent to 
relinquish its right to claim that 
Tri-K was to have completed the 
Project by December 31, 1984? 
(Emphasis added). 
Again, the jury answered in the affirmative. 
Jury Interrogatory 50 asked: 
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Has United Pacific Insurance Company 
established by a preponderance of 
the evidence an intent by Deseret 
Federal to relinquish its right to 
claim that Tri-K was to have 
completed the Project by December 
31, 1984? 
And, again, the Jury answered in the affirmative. 
The jury, when given the opportunity to 
determine waiver with the proper standard, found that 
Deseret Federal clearly waived the December 31, 1984 
completion date. 
IV. 
THE WAIVER TEST GIVEN IN THE 
SUBJECT CASE WAS AMBIGUOUS AND 
UNWORKABLE UNDER THE FACTS OF 
THE CASE. 
The Jury Interrogatories asked the jury to 
consider "any other intent" by Deseret Federal. The jury 
was not asked in the Jury Interrogatories to find a 
single and unique "intent" on the part of Deseret 
Federal. In fact, was asked and found a waiver of the 
completion date AND, also a second intent, which was 
Deseret Federal's intent to defraud Tri-K, using the 
standard of clear and convincing evidence. (See Jury 
Interrogatories 31 through 39). 
The jury could not find that Deseret Federal 
intended only to waive the completion date because the 
jury was clearly convinced that Deseret Federal also 
intended to defraud Tri-K. The jury could properly find 
that both courses were adopted and intended by Deseret 
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Federal in its effort to further its own interests. 
The practical effect of the additional criteria 
for waiver, found in Hunter. demonstrate the 
unworkability of the "inconsistent with any other intent" 
requirement of waiver in commercial cases, such as this 
one. Deseret Federal's intent to defraud Tri-K should 
not insulate it from its waiving of the completion date. 
The trial court's Findings of Fact and 
Judgment, as presently entered, permits Deseret Federal 
to benefit from its wrong doing (the intent to defraud 
Tri-K) by allowing it avoid waiver of the completion 
date. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that Tri-K 
will be irreparably damaged if the present Findings of 
Fact and Judgment are allowed to stand. Tri-K, in good 
faith, remained at the Project and incurred debts for 
labor and materials in an amount of over $166,000.00, 
which Deseret Federal refused to pay. (See Trial 
Exhibits Nos. 41, 42, and 43). In addition to Deseret 
Federal attempting to avoid payment to Tri-K, it also 
attempted to have Tri-K held financially liable for 
failing to complete the Project by claiming the 
completion date was not waived. 
Tri-K was undisputedly told to remain at the 
Project. Tri-K submitted draw requests for its labor and 
materials to Deseret Federal, who accepted the draw 
requests. Tri-K, when it was not paid for its labor and 
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materials, gave notice to Soter and Deseret Federal that 
unless it was paid it would leave the Project. (See 
Trial Exhibit No. 169). Tri-K, when it was not paid, 
left the Project. Deseret Federal made it impossible for 
Tri-K to complete the Project. 
Deseret Federal should not be allowed to 
benefit from its wrongful, self-serving, and malicious 
actions, by hiding behind the ambiguous, unworkable 
waiver standard set forth in Hunter. 
CONCLUSION 
No matter which standard or definition of 
waiver this Court establishes, it is clear, as a matter 
of law, that Deseret Federal's actions were consistent 
with an intent to waive the December 31, 1984 completion 
date. The evidence was clear, abundant, distinct, and 
unequivocal that Deseret Federal knew as early as of the 
fall of 1984 that the Project would not be substantially 
completed by December 31, 1984. Yet Deseret Federal did 
nothing to enforce the completion date provision. In 
fact, Deseret Federal requested Tri-K to remain on the 
job after the completion date, and Deseret Federal 
extended the term for payment of the construction loan, 
which could only be done if there were not breaches 
attributable to the Project. 
Tri-K respectfully requests that, in responding 
to the question certified by the Federal Court, that this 
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Court find that it was an error for the trial court to 
have included the Hunter test in both charging the jury 
and in Jury Interrogatory 24. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of April, 
1992. _ /-
ROBERT W. HUGHES:^="^ 
Attorney for Tri-K General 
Contractors 
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A P P E N D I X 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF. UTAH 
"VlLE-D 
SOTER'S INC., et al., ] 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al., ] 
Defendants, 
SHERWIN KNUDSEN d/b/a ] 
TRI-K GENERAL CONTRACTORS, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SOTER'S, INC., et al. 
Defendants. ; 
RAY26 3SS 
1
 ZiMn at summit County 
0
 D*p«tyCUrt 
i Civil No, 8560 
\ (Judge Ernest Baldwin) 
1 Case No. 8561 
I (Consolidated) 
INTERROGATORIES TO THE JURY 
A. CLAIMS BY SOTER'S. TNC. AGAINST DESERET FEDERAL 
1. Has Soter's, Inc. established, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that as of January 1985 and beyond the 
$3,000,000.00 Construction Loan was in balance because the 
undisbursed portion of the Construction Loan equaled or exceeded 
the estimated costs of completing the Camelot Condominium 
Proj ect? 
XL Yes No 
If you answered Question No. 1 "no," then answer Question 
Nos. 2, 3 and 4. 
If you answered Question No. 1 "yes," then proceed to 
Question No. 5, and do not answer Question Nos. 2, 3 and 4. 
fj,^,2. Has Soter's, Inc. established by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Deseret Federal, by funding the loan on April 24, 
1984 and thereby paying the Zion's obligation, acted in such a 
manner as to distinctly relinquish the right to require that the 
undisbursed portion of the Construction Loan equals or exceeds 
the estimated costs of completing the Camelot Condominium 
Proj ect? 
Yes No 
Has Soter's Inc. established by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Deseret Federal by funding the loan on April 24, 
1984 and thereby paying the Zion's obligation, clearly displayed 
2 
in some unequivocal manner an intent to relinquish the right to 
require that the undisbursed portion of the Construction Loan 
equals or exceeds the estimated costs of completing the Camelot 
Condominium Project? 
Yes No 
M,/V 4. Has S o t e r ' s , Inc . e s tab l i shed by a preponderance of the 
• 
evidence that Deseret Federal's funding of the loan and paying 
the Zion's obligation is consistent only with an intent to 
relinquish the right to require that the undisbursed portion of 
the Construction Loan equals or exceeds the estimated costs of 
completing the Camelot Condominium Project rather than with some 
other intent? 
Yes No 
5. Has Soter's, Inc. established by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that as of January 1985 the Camelot Condominium Project 
could have been completed on or before April 4, 1985? 
Yes x No 
If you answered Question No. 5 "no," then answer Question 
Nos. 6, 7, and 8. 
If you answered Question No. 5 "yes," then proceed to the 
instructions following Question No. 8 and do not answer Question 
Nos. 6, 7, and 8. 
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6. Has Soter's, Inc. established by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Deseret Federal, acted in such a manner as to 
distinctly relinquish the right under the Construction Loan 
Agreement to require that the Camelot Condominium Project be 
completed on or before April 4, 1985? 
A Yes No 
7. Has Soter's Inc. established by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Deseret Federal clearly displayed in some 
unequivocal manner an intent to relinquish the right under the 
Construction Loan Agreement to require that the Camelot 
Condominium Project be completed on or before April 4, 1985? 
/C Yes No 
8. Has Soter's, Inc. established by a preponderance of the 
evidence that any evidence of an intent by Deseret Federal to 
relinquish the right under the Construction Loan Agreement to 
have the Camelot Condominium Project completed on or before 
December 31, 1984 was inconsistent with any other intent? 
A Yes No 
If you answered both Question Nos. 1 and 5 "yes," then 
answer Question No. 9. 
If you answered Question No. 1 "no"; each and every one of 
Question Nos. 2, 3 and 4, "yes"; and Question No. 5 "yes," then 
answer Question No. 9. 
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If you answered Question No, 5 "no"; each and every one of 
Question Nos. 6, 7 and 8, "yes"; and Question No. 1 "yes," then 
answer Question No. 9. 
If you answered Question No. 1 and Question No. 5 "no," and 
each and every one of Question Nos. 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8 "yes," 
then answer Question No. 9. 
If you answered Question No. 1 "no," and any one or more of 
Question Nos. 2, 3, or 4 "no," then proceed to Question No. 10 
and do not answer Question No. 9. 
If you answered Question No. 5 "no," and any one or more of 
Questions Nos. 6, 7, or 8 "no," then proceed to Question No. 10 
and do not answer Question No. 9. 
9. What amount has Soter's, Inc. established by a 
preponderance of the evidence will fairly compensate it for the 
loss proximately caused by Deseret Federal's decision to stop 
further funding? 
Answer: -^ 'I , ^ Q^/SS^S&s V WVCX&TT ^ 
pr*c *\\Vf0, 000.00^ 
B. CLAIMS BY DESERET FEDERAL AND CONTINENTAL FEDERAL AGAINST 
SOTER'S, INC, 
10. With regard to each of the events of default set forth 
below, has Deseret Federal and Continental Federal established by 
a preponderance of the evidence whether such event of default 
occurred: 
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INTENT ow^er? AfcArrs^ T FWKftfAv 
a. As of April 1984, the $3,000,000.00 Construction 
Loan was out of balance. 
Yes A No 
b. Soter's, Inc. failed to deposit funds with Deseret 
Federal in an amount sufficient to bring the $3,000,000.00 
Construction Loan in balance after receiving written demand from 
Deseret Federal. 
Yes / \ No 
c. The Camelot Condominium Project was not completed 
on or before April 4, 1985. 
X Yes No 
d. Soter's, Inc. abandoned work on the Camelot 
Condominium Project and construction ceased for twenty-one 
consecutive days. 
/ \ Yes No 
e. Soter's, Inc. failed to cause the construction of 
the Camelot Condominium Project to be prosecuted with diligence 
and continuity. 
Yes f \ No 
f. Soter's, Inc. permitted mechanic's liens to be 
filed against the Camelot Condominium Project. 
X Yes No 
g. Soter 's , Inc. fai led to pay principal and interest 
on or before October 5, 1985. 
A* Yes No 
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11. What amount of indebtedness (principal, interest and 
costs) have Deseret Federal and Continental Federal established 
by a preponderance of the evidence is due from Soter's, Inc. 
under the $3,000,000.00 Construction Loan Agreement, the 
Promissory Note, and the Deed of Trust as of April 30, 1988? 
Answer: 
12. As of August 22, 1984 when the Promissory Note was 
endorsed to Continental Federal by Deseret Federal, did 
Continental Federal have notice that Soter's, Inc. could claim 
that Deseret Federal had waived the requirement that the 
undisbursed portion of the Construction Loan equals or exceeds 
the estimated costs of completing the Camelot Condominiums? 
Yes No 
13. Has Soter's, Inc. established by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Continental Federal, after August 22, 1984 acted in 
such a manner as to distinctly relinquish the right it had as 
holder of the Promissory Note to require Soter's, Inc. to 
complete the Camelot Condominium Project by April 4, 1985 
pursuant to the Construction Loan Agreement? 
/\ Yes No 
14. Has Soter's, Inc. established by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Continental Federal, after August 22, 1984 clearly 
displayed in some unequivocal manner an intent to relinquish the 
7 
right it had as holder of the Promissory Note to require Soter's, 
Inc. to complete the Camelot Condominium Project by April 4, 1985 
pursuant to the Construction Loan Agreement? 
Yes /\ No 
15. Has Soter's, Inc. established by a preponderance of the 
evidence that actions taken by Continental Federal, after August 
22, 1984 are consistent only with an intent to relinquish the 
right of Continental Federal as holder of the Promissory Note to 
require that the Camelot Condominium Project be completed by 
April 4f 1985 pursuant to the Construction Loan Agreement rather 
than with some other intent?^ 
Yes **• No 
C. CLAIMS BY DESERET renin?IT. mamBaaamsMMfc. AGAINST TRI-K 
AND UNITED PACIFIC INSURANCE COMPANY 
16• Did the final Construction Contract entered into 
between Tri-K and Soter's, Inc. provide for a lump sum 
construction cost of $2,736.850.00 and a completion date of "in a 
timely manner"? 
Yes X No 
If you answered Question No. 16 "yes," then answer Question 
No. 17. 
If you answered Question No. 16 "no," then proceed to 
Question No. 18 and do not answer Question No. 17. 
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i 
complete the Construction Contract or remedy the default of Tri-K 
under the Construction Contract? 
/\ Yes No 
27. What amount has Deseret Federal established by a 
preponderance of the evidence is the cost of completing 
construction of the Camelot Condominium Project as of May 1988? 
Answer: ' t2^Ot0OCf- j^,frgg,ft» 
28. Has Tri-K or United Pacific Insurance Company 
established by a preponderance of the evidence that Deseret 
Federal and Soter's, Inc. failed to mitigate their damages? 
/^ Yes No 
If you answered Question No. 28 "yes," answer Question No. 
29. 
If you answered Question No. 28 "no," then proceed to 
Question No. 30 and do not answer Question No. 29. 
29. What is the amount, if any, that Tri-K or United 
Pacific Insurance Company has established by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the figure set forth in Question No. 27 should 
be reduced by reason of Deseret Federal's or Soter's failing to 
mitigate their damages? 
Answer: ^=*£=tf7^ $7gQ. / f r f i 
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Construction Contract to have the Camelot Condominium Project 
completed on or before December 31, 1984? 
/ \ Yes No 
24. Has Tri-K established by a preponderance of the 
evidence that any evidence of an intent by Deseret Federal to 
relinquish the right under the Construction Contract to have the 
Camelot Condominium Project completed on or before December 31, 
1984 was inconsistent with any other intent? 
Yes y \ No 
If you answered any one or more of Question Nos. 22, 23 and 
24 "no," then proceed to answer Question Nos. 26 through 29 and 
do not answer Question No. 25. 
If you answered each and every one of Question Nos. 22, 23 
and 24 "yes," then answer Question Nos. 25 through 29. 
\J4^#25. Did Soter's, Inc. breach the Construction Contract by 
failing to pay the construction draw requests for the months 
January through April, 1985. 
Yes No 
26. Has Deseret Federal established by a preponderance of 
the evidence that United Pacific Insurance Company did not 
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^f#^ ff17. Has Deseret Federal established by a preponderance of 
the evidence that Tri-K did not substantially complete 
construction of the Camelot Condominium Project in a timely 
manner? 
Yes No 
18. Did the final Construction Contract entered into 
between Tri-K and Soter's, Inc. provide for a lump sum 
construction amount of $2,801,850.00 and a completion date of 
December 31, 1984? 
/Y Yes No 
If you answered Question No. 18 "yes," then answer Question 
No. 19. 
If you answered Question No. 18 "no," then proceed to 
Question No. 20 and do not answer Question No. 19. 
19. Has Deseret Federal established by a preponderance of 
the evidence that Tri-K did not substantially complete 
construction of the Camelot Condominium Project on or before 
December 31, 1984? 
/^ Yes No 
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20. Has Deseret Federal established by a preponderance of 
the evidence that Tri-K withdrew all or a portion of its profits 
from draw requests paid by Deseret Federal? 
A * Yes No 
If you answered Question No. 20 "yes," then answer Question 
No. 21. 
If you answered Question No. 20 "no," then proceed directly 
to Question No. 22 and do not answer Question No. 21. 
21. What dollar amount of profit has Deseret Federal 
established by a preponderance of the evidence did Tri-K receivet 
from Soter's, Inc. and Deseret Federal through draw requests 
submitted to and paid by Deseret Federal? 
Answer: 
22. Has Tri-K established by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Deseret Federal acted in such a manner as to 
distinctly relinquish the right under the Construction Contract 
to have the Camelot Condominium Project completed on or before 
December 31, 1984? 
?\ Yes No 
23. Has Tri-K established by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Deseret Federal clearly displayed in some 
unequivocal manner an intent to relinquish the right under the 
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D. CLAIMS BY TRI-K AGAINST DESERET FEDERAL 
30. Has Tri-K established by clear and convincing evidence 
that Deseret Federal made a representation to Tri-K that Deseret 
Federal would pay Tri-K for construction costs incurred for the 
Camelot Condominium Project during January, February, March, and 
April, 1985? 
Yes No x 
If you answered Question No. 30 "no," then proceed directly 
to Question No. 40 and do not answer Question Nos. 31 through 39. 
If you answered Question No. 30 "yes," then answer Question 
Nos. 31 through 38. 
31. Has Tri-K established by clear and convincing evidence 
that the representation referred to in Question No. 30 concerned 
a presently existing material fact? 
x Yes No 
32. Has Tri-K established by clear and convincing evidence 
that the representation referred to in Question No. 30 was false? 
Yes No 
»p  
33. Has Tri-K established by clear and convincing evidence 
that the person who made the representation referred to in 
Question No. 30 knew that the representation was false, or made 
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the representation recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient 
information to know whether the fact was true or false? 
/\ Yes No 
34. Has Tri-K established by clear and convincing evidence 
that the representation referred to in Question No. 30 was made 
for the purpose of inducing Tri-K to act? 
S\ Yes No 
35. Has Tri-K established by clear and convincing evidence 
that Tri-K acted reasonably and in ignorance of the falsity of 
the representation referred to in Question No. 30? 
/\ Yes No 
36. Has Tri-K established by clear and convincing evidence 
that Tri-K actually relied upon the representation referred to in 
Question No. 30? 
x Yes No 
37. Has Tri-K established by clear and convincing evidence 
that the representation referred to in Question No. 30 induced 
Tri-K to act? 
V 
/ \ Yes No 
14 
38. Has Tri-K established by clear and convincing evidence 
that Tri-K suffered financial loss because of the representation 
referred to in Question No. 30? 
X Yes No 
If you answered Question No. 38 "no," then proceed directly 
to Question No. 40 and do not answer Question No. 39. 
If you answered Question No. 38 "yes," then answer Question 
No. 39. 
39. What is the amount of financial loss that Tri-K has 
suffered? 
Answer: ' ^ ^ 5 8 + l K T g p e ^ T -TO PAT£ 
E. CLAIMS BY UNITED PACIFIC INSURANCE COMPANY AGAINST DESERET 
FEDERAL 
40. Has United Pacific Insurance Company established by 
clear and convincing evidence that the representation that 
Deseret Federal would escrow funds into a construction account in 
the amount of $2,801,850.00 for the construction of the Camelot 
Condominium Project, pursuant to the Construction Loan Agreement, 
concerned a presently existing material fact? 
Yes /\ No 
If you answered Question No. 40 "no," then proceed to 
Question No. 48 and do not answer Question Nos. 41 through 47. 
15 
If you answered Question No. 40 "yes," then answer Question 
No. 41 through 46. 
fs|^.41. Has United Pacific Insurance Company established by 
clear and convincing evidence that the representation referred to 
in Question 40 was false? 
Yes No 
Jvl*n' 42. Has United Pacific Insurance Company established by 
clear and convincing evidence that the person who made the 
representation referred to in Question No. 40 knew that the 
representation was false, or did he make the representation 
recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient information to know 
whether the representation was true or false? 
Yes No 
43. Has United Pacific Insurance Company established by 
clear and convincing evidence that the representation referred to 
in Question No. 40 was made for the purpose of inducing United 
Pacific Insurance Company to act? 
Yes No 
\\.&44. Has United Pacific Insurance Company established by 
clear and convincing evidence that United Pacific Insurance 
M 
16 
Company acted reasonably and in ignorance of the falsity of the 
representation referred to in Question No. 40? 
_ Yes No 
J^ ^ 4 5 . Has United Pacific Insurance Company established by 
clear and convincing evidence that United Pacific Insurance 
Company actually relied upon the representation referred to in 
Question No. 40? 
Yes No 
Has United Pacific Insurance Company established by 
clear and convincing evidence that United Pacific Insurance 
Company suffered any financial loss because of the representation 
referred to in Question No. 40? 
Yes No 
If you answered Question No. 46 "no," then proceed to 
Question No. 48 and do not answer Question No. 47. 
If you answered Question No. 46 "yes," then answer Question 
No. 47. 
^.n.47. What is the amount of financial loss that United 
Pacific Insurance Company has suffered? 
Answer: 
17 
48. Has United Pacific Insurance Company established by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Deseret Federal acted in such 
a manner as to distinctly relinquish its right to claim that 
Tri-K was to have completed the project by December 31, 1984? 
/\ Yes No 
49. Has United Pacific Insurance Company established by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Deseret Federal clearly 
displayed in some unequivocal manner an intent to relinquish its 
right to claim that Tri-K was to have completed the project by 
December 31, 198,4? 
Yes No 
50. Has United Pacific Insurance Company established by a 
perponderance of the evidence an intent by Deseret Federal to 
relinquish its right to claim that Tri-K was to have completed 
the project by Decmeber 31, 1984. 
?\ Yes No 
F. CLAIMS BY TRI-K AGAINST SOTER'S, INC. 
51. What i s the amout of retainage which Tri-K has 
e s t a b l i s h e d by a preponderance of the evidence that i t i s 
e n t i t l e d to be paid by S o t e r ' s , Inc.? 
Answer: • k A\\*Wl 5% * 1NWF&X TO W 7 ^ 
52. Has Tri-K established by a preponderance of the 
evidence that it is entitled to receive from Soter's, Inc. the 
profit which it would have received upon completion of the 
Camelot Condominium Project? 
A Yes No 
DATED this ' iS'J day of May, 1988._^- . q 
W/ylAdi^' 
Foreman ; 
NAME: Soter's. Inc. Loan f - 425101 
Catagory Ho. 
001 
002 
003 
004 
Name of Catagory 
Legal Fees 
Engineering 
Accounting & 
Set-Up 
Connection Tees 
Payee 
Closing Draw 9-28-83 
Snow* Chrlstensen & Martineau 
Eckoff• Watson & Preater 
Sam F. Soter Investments 
Jlmie Jones 
Hober, Erickson I Butler 
Summit Park Water Co. 
Amount Disbursed 
50.000.00 
20,000.00 
5,000.00 
55,000.00 
10,000.00 
28,654.96 
007 
008 
010 
Commitment Fees 
Appraisal 
Misc. 
Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement 
Oi strict 
Summit County 
Zions First National Bank 
Sam F. Soter, Investments 
Zane Bergeson 
Summit County (Building Permit) 
Greene, Callister & Nebeker 
Sam F. Soter Investments (Fire fees) 
Sunmit County (Engineering Fees, 
Inspection) 
Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement 
District (Engineering Fees) 
GBR Engineering (Geotechnical Eng) 
Delta Geotechnical Consultants, Inc. 
(Geotechnical Engineering) 
Associated T i t le 
on 
020 
022 
023 
046 
047 
Land 
Direct Costs 
Excavation & F i l l 
Masonry 
Water 
Culverts, Ditches 
& Site Prep. 
Mobilization & 
Set-Up 
Sumut Park Company 
Tri-K Construction 
Interstate Brick & Tri-K 
Summit Park Water Co. 
Tri-K Const. 
Tri-K Construction 
41.600.00 
4.745.04 
26.650.00 
26.650.00 
1.200.00 
1.200.00 
14,179.84 
3.000.00 
2.762.20 
339.64 
166.61 
315.00 
3.000.00 
3.439.50 
250.000.00 
9.000.00 
180.000.00 
27,000.00 
60,000.00 
7.500.00 
TOTAL CLOSING DRAW 831,402.79 
DRAW # 1 November 2 , 1983 
006 
008 
010 
020 
026 
Interest from 
9-28-83 to 9-30-83 
Appraisal 
Misc. 
Excavation & F i l l 
Electrical 
Zions First National Bank 
Richard Hawks Assoc. 
Associated Ti t le (T i t le Insuarance) 
Sutnit County (Engineering Fees) 
Sunnit County Treasurer (Taxes) 
Tri-K Construction 
Tri-K Const. & L.A. Winner Electric 
DRAW TOTAL 
CUMULATIVE DRAW DOWN 
888.35 
340.00 
140.00 
1,209.06 
1,373.70 
14.400.00 
3.873.02 
22,224.13 
$853,626.92 
ORAM 12 December 5. 1983 
006 Interest from Zions First National Bank 
10-1-83 to 10-31-83 
8.883.48 
008 Appraisal Richard Hawks Assoc. 135.00 
010 
021 
047 
Misc. 
Concrete 
Mobil izat ion & 
Set-IJp 
Associated T i t l e (Endorsement) 
Carroon; Black (Builders Risk Policy) 
Tr i-K Construction (Blasting) 
(Gravel) 
Tri-K Const.. Haleco 
Tr i-K Construction 
Tri-K Construction 
DRAW TOTAL 
CUMULATIVE DRAW DOWN 
25.00 
3.024.00 
13.497.00 
8.000.00 
26.068.87 
11.931.13 
3.583.00 
75.147.48 
$928,774.40 
DRAW 13 January 12, 1983 
006 Interest from Zions First National Bank 
11-1-83 to 11-30-83 
9,112.99 
003 Appraisal Richard Hawks Assoc. 135.00 
010 
021 
029 
Misc. 
Concrete 
Framing 
Sunmltt County (Engineering Fees) 
Assocated T i t l e (Endorsement) 
Snydervi l le Basin Sewer Improvement 
D i s t r i c t (Engineering) 
Tr i -K Construction 
Tri-K Construction 
DRAW TOTAL 
CUMULATIVE DRAW DOWN 
363.49 
25.00 
444.99 
10.000.00 
73.653.00 
93.734.47 
$1,022,508.87 
DRAW #4 lurch 5, 1984 
006 Interest from 
1-1-84 to 1-31-84 
Interest from 
12-1-A3 to 12-31-83 
Zions First National Bank 
Zions First National Bank 
029 Framing Tri-K Construction 
033 Metal Roofing Tri-K Construction 
4-4-84 
029 Framing Tri-K Construction 
025 Plunbing & Heating Tri-K Construction 
0RAU TOTAL 
CUMULATIVE DRAW DOWN 
10.922.40 
10.120.95 
106.614.00 
601.000.00 
6.720.00 
10.542.12 
204.919.47 
$1,227,428.34 
006 
INTEREST DRAW 
Interest 
March 19. 1984 
Zions F i r s t National Bank 
CUMULATIVE DRAW DOWN 
10.643.84 
11.238.072.18 
Associated Title 
Zions First National Bank 
Greene. Callister & Nebeker 
TOTAL PAYOFF 
Title Update 
Interest from 3-1-84 
to 4-6-84 
Attorneys Fees 
April 6. 1984 
25.00 
15.613.13 
500.00 
$1.254.210.31 
NON CONSTRUCTION COSTS 
ZIONS 
Closing Draw 9-28-83 
Legal Fees $ 50,000.00 
Engineering 
Eckoff, Watson & Prater 20,000.00 
Sam F. Soter Investments 5,000,00 
Jimie Jones 55,000.00 
Accounting & Set Up 10,000.00 
Connecting Fees 
Summit Park Water Co. 28,645.96 
Synderville Basin Sewer Improvements Dist. 41,600.00 
Summit County 4,745.04 
Zions 
Commitment Fees 26,650.00 
Commitment Fees 26,650.00 
Appraisal 
Sam F. Soter, Investment 1,200.00 
Zane Bergeson 1,200.00 
Misc. 
Summit County (Building Permit) 14,179.00 
Legal Fees 3,000.00 
Fire Fees 2,762.20 
Summit County (Engineering Fees, Inspections) 339.64 
Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District 
(Engineering Fees) 166.61 
GBR Engineering (Geotechnical Engineering) 315.00 
Delta Geotechnical Consultants, Inc. 
(Geotechnical Engineering) 3,000.00 
Associated Title 3,439.50 
Land 250,000.00 
Summit Park Water Company 27,000.00 
Draw #1 Novemeber 2, 1983 
Zions Bank (Interest) $ 888.35 
Appraisal (Richark Hawks Assoc.) 340.00 
Associated Title (Title Insurance) 140.00 
Summit County (Engineering Fees) 1,209.06 
Summit County Treasurer (Taxes) 1,373.70 
Draw #2 December 5, 1983 
Zions First National Bank 8,883.48 
Appraisal (Richard Hawks Assoc.) 135.00 
Associated Title (Endorsement) 25.00 
Carrons, Black (Builders Risk Insurance Policy) 3,024.00 
Draw #3 January 12, 1983 
Zions (Interest) 9,112.99 
Appraisal (Richard Hawks Asoc.) 135.00 
Summit County (Engineering Fees) 363.49 
Associated Title (Endorsement) 25.00 
Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District 
(Engineering) 444.99 
Draw #4 March 5, 1984 
Zions (Interest) 10,922.40 
Z ions (Interest) 10,120.95 
Interest #5 March 19, 1984 10,643.84 
Associated Title (Update) 25.00 
Zions (Interest) 15,613.13 
Attorney Fees 500.00 
TOTAL PAID BY ZIONS $ 648,818.33 
DESERT FEDERAL 
Loan Closing 
Zions (Interest) $ 3,205.44 
Zions (Interest) 3,205.44 
Zions (Interest) 1,373.76 
Loan fees 15,000.00 
Credit Report 43.00 
Commitment Fee 10,000.00 
Attorney Fees 11,342.31 
Prepaid Commitment Fees 30,000.00 
Interest Reserve 195,000.00 
TOTAL PAID BY DFS $ 269,169.95 
648,818.33 
269,169.95 
TOTAL 
TOTAL 
PAID 
PAID 
BY 
BY 
ZIONS 
DFS 
TOTAL SOFT COSTS PAID $ 917,988.28 
Continental Federal Savings and Loan Association 
EXECUTIVE OFFICES: 4 0 0 UNIVERSITY DRIVE • FAIRFAX. VIRGINIA OWO • (HO) MI-MOO 
ToOflMi W. OfWMMfll 
ViotPmidMC 
Maaafv, Owtmctjoo Loans 
October 31, 1984 
Mr. Roger Brown 
Vice President 
Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. 
3860 South 2300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Re: loan to Soter, Inc. 
Summit Park, Utah 
Dear Mr. Brown: 
Based on my conversation today with Mr. Anderson of Deseret Federal 
Savings 6 Loan, it is apparent that my letter to you of October 10, 1984, 
did not adequately impress upon you Continental Federal's concerns regarding 
the above referenced loan. 
Our basic problems stem around two issues which your association seems 
to have difficulty in addressing. One, the fact that a land advance was 
made in the amount of $250,000 which was not approved by Continental Federal 
Savings 6 Loan, in fact documentation that was provided to Continental Federal 
by Deseret Federal Savings and Loan referenced the source of equity in the 
proposed project: of $250,000 to be in the land. The second item is the fact 
that thru the purchase of the Zion Bank loan, Deseret Federal has over advanced 
the softcost category that is referenced in the building loan agreement for the 
subject loan. 
At this stage, although the work continues to progress in a satisfactory 
fashion based on information that is ^ iven to us by Mr. Anderson, we have still 
not dealt with the problem of the overdisbursement. In my letter to you of 
October 10, 1984, I specifically requested a plan to be proposed by Deseret 
Federal Savings & Loan to resolve the problems that were specifically mentioned 
in my letter. Obviously, a written proposal has not been submitted to Continental 
Federal and considering the time that has transpired since my letter, I have no 
reason to believe that Deseret is preparing a written recommendation to Continental 
Federal, therefore our position at this stage is that we will not make additional 
advances on this loan until Deseret has either prepared and formulated a plan to 
track the overdisbursements we've experienced to date, or Deseret can obtain the 
$250,000 land advance from the Soters' and will fund Deseret1 s $350,000 Line of 
Credit and to place those funds in a demand deposit account, to be disbursed 
in accordance with the construction disbursements under the full approval of 
Continental Federal Savings 6 Loan. 
m 
Mr. Rogar Brown 
Octobar 31, 1984 
Paga - 2 -
Although Ifa sura that our proposal is not tarribly attractiva to 
Dasarat Fadaral, lines Dasarat has not providad us with anothar plan at 
this staga, this is tha only plan for rastructuring that wa find accapt-
abla to us. In tha avant that this is not accaptabla to Dasarat Fadaral, 
as I discussad today with you at your axacutiva offica, Continantal 
Fadaral will axpact and intand for Dasarat Fadaral to rapurchasa tha loan 
in full and continua to sarvica tha loan as Dasarat Fadaral dasiras. 
Sincaraly, 
Thomas W. Grantham 
Vica Prasidant 
TWG/amn 
cc: Mr. Bruca Cundick 
Prasidant 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
A Towards the latter part of the loan as far 
as my affiliation with it. Before construction totally 
stopped. 
Q Had you authorized payment on that draw 
request? 
A I hadn't done anything with it, because I was 
7 instructed not to do anything with it. 
8 Q Who instructed you not to do anything with 
9 it? 
10 A That was Rod Brown and Ron Frandsen. 
11 Q Did they tell you why you were not to do 
12 anything with it? 
13 A I was told there were problems with 
14 Continental Federal- And that they had indicated to us 
15 that if we paid any additional draw requests we were in 
16 second position to them. 
17 Q Did they indicate to you at that time that 
t * 
18 the refusal was based on anything Sherwin Knudsen had 
19 done or not done? 
20 A No. Nothing like that was ever indicated to 
21 me. 
22 Q Do you know if there were subsequent draw 
23 requests after the one you have just spoken of that 
24 were also not paid? 
25 A I believe there were a couple of others. 
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Q Were you given any additional reasons why 
those draw requests should not be paid? 
A No. 
Q Do you know of approximately when Mr. Knudsen 
left — ceased working at the Camelot Condominium 
project? 
A March or April of r85, I believe. 
Q Prior to the date that Mr. Knudsen left the 
project, had you ever indicated to him that he was in 
breach of his construction contract? 
A I never did, no. 
Q Do you know if there were any discussions 
prior to the date he left concerning that subject at 
Deseret Federal? 
A Of his construction contract? I'm not aware 
of any. 
Q Now, during the time you were servicing this 
loan, did you ever become aware that there were not 
enough funds in the loan to pay the amount of the costs 
of construction on this loan? 
A Yes. 
Q How did you become aware of that, sir? 
A It's kind of a long, drawn out process. I 
had requested an accounting from Zions First National 
Bank early on when we first got the loan. And that took 
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TRI-K 
GENERAL CONTRACTORS 
3131 DEERHOLLOW DRIVE SANDY. UTAH 84092 (801) 942-2232 
A p r i l 16, 1985 
Gregory S. Soter 
Soter's Inc. 
1414 South 700 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 
Ret Camelot Condominium Project 
Dear Greg: 
This letter constitutes formal notice that Soter's Inc. is in default 
under that certain Construction Contract between Soter's Inc. and Tri-K 
Contractors, dated August 15, 1983 (the "Contrnct") because of Soter's 
failure to pay the following draws as requested by Tri-K: January - $30,609-90; 
February - $65,055.00i and March - $71,000.00 
Unless payment of all draws described above is made on or before the close 
of business on Friday, April 19, 1985, the Contract will be terminated and Tri-
te Contractors will have no further obligations to Soter's in connection therewith. 
Any such termination will not constitute a waiver of any right which Tri-K 
Contractors may have against Soter's or any other party with respect to payment 
due under the Contract or damages on account of the breach thereof, including 
any right to payment of profit to which Tri-K t* entitled. 
Sincerely yours, 
TRI-K CONTRACTORS 
"Sherwin Knudsen 
SK:ead 
cc: Stan Stoll, 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
cc: Rod Brown, 
Deseret Federal Savings 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: YEAH, R IGHT. 
THE COURT: SO, THEY SHOULD REDUCE THAT L I E N JUDGMENT 
AND THAT'S THE AMOUNT. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: THAT'S RIGHT. AND THAT SHOULD BE THE 
AMOUNT THAT RENDERED AGAINST SOTORS I N C . THE JUDGMENT SAYS 
4 19 AGAINST SOTORS I N C . TOO. 
THE COURT: YES. WELL - -
MR. SUMMERHAYS: AND WE JUST WANT I T TO BE THE SAME 
AMOUNT. 
MR. CROCKETT: THERE'S ONE ISSUE, YOUR HONOR, I BEG TO 
D I F F E R . THERE IS A CLAIM BY KNUDSON FOR H I S RETENTION OR 
RETAINAGE AGAINST SOTORS. THERE IS NO CLAIM BY KNUDSON AGAINST 
DESERET FEDERAL FOR THAT RETENTION OR RETAINAGE. THE COURT 
CAN READ THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER AND THAT 'S A DIFFERENT SUM THERE. 
I THINK THAT WHAT WE'RE DEALING W I T H , THAT 1 0 2 , 0 0 0 , THERE'S 
S T I L L DISPUTE OVER THE RETENTION, BUT I THOUGHT THAT WAS RESERVED 
FOR THE CASE IN ARGUMENT. 
THE COURT: THAT'S RIGHT. BUT, SAYING SOTORS — AND I ALSO 
FEEL UNDER THESE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES AND ALL THE LAW THAT 
RIGHT TO HAVE THE JOB COMPLETED, AND THAT THEY INDUCED AND LEAD 
ON TO KEEP ON GOING ON WITH THE JOB. AND WHAT MISTER WHAT'S 
H I S NAMF, KNUDSON, WAS ENTITLED WHEN HE WASN'T PAID ACCORDING 
TO THE LAW TO WALK OFF THE JOB AND QUIT COMING, WHEN HE 
WASN'T PAID TO GET H IS DRAW OH H IS RETENTION. AND 1, THINK HIS 
' r 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL KEPOKTKRS 
«?0 KEAHNS (tulLO<\C 
5AII LAKE ClfT UTAH d«IOt 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
12 
16 
19 
20 
LEAVING WAS
 1 THE FACTS IN EVIDENCE, AND THE JURY VERDICT J U S T I F I E D 
AT THE TIME. 
I THINK AT THE TIME OF THE - - I THINK THE DAMAGE IS 
SUFFERED BY SOTORS I N C . THE JURY'S ANSWER, $ 2 , 6 0 2 , 5 0 0 AND THAT'S 
EACH AND ALL AND EVERY ONE OF THE BITS OF DAMAGES THEY SUFFERED. 
BUT, FROM THAT — WERE LESS COST OF COMPLETION. 
AND SOME OTHERS WE HAVE TO TAKE — 1 THINK THERE'S 
THE ITEM OF FAIL ING TO MITIGATE THE DAMAGE DESERET FEDERAL HAD, 
NO DOUBT TO M I T I G A T E . $ 7 5 0 , 0 0 0 IS THE ADDITIONAL COST OF 
1 0 M I T I G A T I O N . AND SOTORS FROM THAT AMOUNT-THE* DAMAGE. ADDITIONAL 
n I AMOUNT OF $750 FOR THE FAILURE TO M I T I G A T E , REDUCE 7 5 0 , 0 0 0 TO 
M I T I G A T E . 
1 3 I AND THERE WAS NO QUESTION ABOUT THE RETENTION THAT 
1 4 T R I - K HAD COMING, WAS THERE? 
15 MR. HUGHES: NO. I THINK THAT - -
1 6 THE COURT: THAT I S N ' T THE FOURTEEN HUNDRED NINETEEN — 
11 J MR. HUGHES: NO. 
THE COURT: THAT'S A MATTER WE TAKE UP TO THE TIME OF THE 
LIEN? 
MR. DAVIES: EOWR/SOME ODD THOUSAND DOLLARS. BUT, I DON'T 
2 1 I THINK THERE'S ANY DISPUTE BETWEEN THE PARTIES AS TO THE AMOUNT 
2 2 THAT WENT INTO EVIDENCE WITH REGARD TO THAT. THERE IS A 
23 DISPUTE BETWEEN THE PARTIES AS THE COURT KNOWS AND HAS RESERVED 
24 AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THAT IS LEGITIMATELY INCLUDED WITHIN THE 
25 I MECHANIC'S L IEN OR WHETHER OR NOT THAT'S JUST A CONTRACT CLAIM 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL KEPOKTERS 
4A> Kf AHNi (tullOlNu 
SAtf lAnc Cirv UTAH «<1I0I 
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EXTENSION AGREEMENT 
Date April 2. 1985 
Soter's Inc. by: 
NAME OF TRUSTORS: Greg S. Soter, Julie R. Soter, and Eva S. Soter 
DATE OF NOTE AND DEED OF TRUST: April 4, 1984 
RECORDED: May 3, 1984 
COUNTY Summit 
BOOK 298 
PAGE 626 
ENTRY NUMBER 219995. 
MATURITY DATE OR DATE FIRST PAYMENT DUE: April 5, 1985 
The undersigned trustors request that the maturity date or the 
due date of the first payment of the note and Deed of Trust described 
above be extended to October 5. 1985. 
We understand and agree that we will be charged an extension fee 
of ** if this request is approved. 
We have selected the following method for payment of the above 
fee: 
( ) enclosed is our payment for the fee 
P?M*"please charge our construction loan 
TRUSTORS;.----Sater,s: Inc..t%r.: 
B y ^ - ' ^ ! ^ ^ , ^ 
[pptysjFs^ez, Secretary/Treasurer 
^ / \ [ 
Juiie\ R. Soter , Vice pres ident 
Bv:
 *rw» ' M . I V ^ S ^ V Eva s. Soter, President 
Extension Request Approved 
LOAN COMMITTEE / A : . ^ v ^ > / V ^ V ^ T ^ T 
T^fUJ^C^ ttCtAar-+ 
Date: 
